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TEXAS 
 
 
Don Hueske & Garrett Korbitz* 
 
I. Introduction 
The following is an update on Texas legislative activity and case law 
relating to oil, gas and mineral law from August 1, 2018 to July 31, 2019.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 * Don Hueske is a Member in The Woodlands office of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC and 
has been Board Certified in Oil, Gas and Mineral Law by the Texas Board of Legal 
Specialization. He can be reached at don.hueske@steptoe-johnson.com. Garrett L. Korbitz, an 
Associate in The Woodlands office of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, focuses his practice in the 
area of energy law and mineral title law, and is licensed to practice in Texas. 
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II. Judicial Developments 
A. Accommodation Doctrine 
1. VirTex Operating Co. v. Bauerle, No. 04-16-00549-CV, 2017 WL 
5162546, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 8, 2017) rev. denied 
(Mar. 29, 2019), reh’g filed (May 15, 2019) (mem. op.). 
Robert Leon Bauerle and Cynthia Bauerle (“the Bauerles”) own and 
operate an 8,500-acre ranch, which they regularly lease to hunters.1 The 
hunters utilize helicopters on the land, often flying between 4-5 feet above 
the ground to capture deer.2  
VirTex Operating Co., Inc. and VirTex Producing Company, L.P. 
(“VirTex”) own and operate nine wells on the property.3 VirTex proposed an 
easement to the Baurles in order to replace the generators with overhead 
powerlines to run the pumpjacks associated with the wells.4 The Bauerles 
refused this proposal and asked VirTex to halt construction of the powerlines. 
VirTex obliged.5 The trial court found in favor of the Baurles, finding that 
VirTex’s proposal to install the overhead powerlines violated the 
accommodation doctrine and that VirTex breached the surface use agreement 
that they had with the Baurles.6 
On appeal, VirTex argued that the Bauerles failed to prove the elements 
of the accommodation doctrine.7 First, VirTex claimed that the Baurles failed 
to prove that the proposed powerlines would completely or substantially 
impair existing hunting operations on the land.8 The court rejected this 
argument, finding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude 
that the powerlines would significantly limit the Bauerles’s and their lessee’s 
use of the land for hunting activities.9 The evidence demonstrated that flying 
helicopters on the property with the presence of these powerlines would 
                                                                                                                 
 1. VirTex Operating Co. v. Bauerle, No. 04-16-00549-CV, 2017 WL 5162546, at *1 
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 8, 2017), rev. denied (Mar. 29, 2019), reh’g filed (May 15, 
2019) (mem. op.). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at *2. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at *3. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at *7. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss2/23
2019] Texas 283 
 
 
constitute “a very dangerous situation,” with some pilots even saying that 
they would no longer conduct the flights if the powerlines were to stay.10  
 VirTex next argued that the Baurles did not prove that there was not a 
reasonable alternative to these helicopter operations.11 The court again 
rejected this argument. VirTex argued that there were reasonable 
alternatives, such as four wheelers, which could be used where the proposed 
powerlines would be placed.12 Further, this would allow the use of 
helicopters on the other 5,500 acres where there would be no powerlines.13 
The Baurles countered, claiming that due to the unpredictable nature of the 
deer and the amount of ground the hunters must cover, helicopters are the 
only reasonable means of conducting the captures.14 Two of the hunters who 
lease the property from the Baurles supported their counter argument and 
claimed that they would no longer lease the property if they were unable to 
conduct the deer captures via helicopter.15 
Lastly, VirTex argued that the Baurles had not shown that there was a 
reasonable, customary and industry-accepted alternative available to 
VirTex.16 However, the court found the Bauerle’s proposals had satisfied this 
element.17 The Baurles proposed a number of reasonable alternatives to the 
overhead powerlines such as: continuing running the pumpjacks with the 
generators, underground powerlines, or running the pumpjacks with diesel or 
natural gas.18 Evidence showed that running the pumpjacks by natural gas or 
by underground powerlines were reasonable alternatives, despite resulting in 
additional costs to VirTex.19 An owner and officer of VirTex also testified 
that they could continue powering the pumpjacks with the generators and that 
they were using this more expensive method elsewhere.20 The court did not 
find that the additional hardships or costs that these alternatives posed made 
them unreasonable.21 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Id. at *5. 
 11. Id. at *3. 
 12. Id. at *8. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at *7. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at *3. 
 17. Id. at *10. 
 18. Id. at *9. 
 19. Id. at *9-10. 
 20. Id. at *10. 
 21. Id. 
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The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and the supreme 
court has denied VirTex’s petition to hear the case.22 
B. Force Majeure Events 
1. TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018) rev. denied, 2019 Tex. LEXIS 834 
(Tex. Aug. 30, 2019). 
TEC Olmos, LLC (“Olmos”) entered into a farmout agreement 
(“agreement”) with ConocoPhillips Company (“ConocoPhillips”) to test-
drill land that ConocoPhillips had leased.23 The parties agreed to a specific 
date by which drilling had to be completed, a $500,000 liquidated damages 
provision if Olmos did not meet this deadline, and a force majeure provision 
that outlined different occurrences which would toll the drilling deadline.24 
These occurrences included “fire, flood, storm, act of God, governmental 
authority, labor disputes, war or any other cause not enumerated herein but 
which is beyond the reasonable control of the Party whose performance is 
affected. . . .”25 
The price of oil dropped significantly after the parties entered into the 
agreement causing Olmos to lose its financing for the project. Unable to 
secure other financing, Olmos failed to meet the drilling deadline. Olmos 
invoked the force majeure provision claiming that the sudden drop in oil 
prices was a covered occurrence. ConocoPhillips sought a declaration that 
the drop in oil prices was not a covered occurrence and that they were entitled 
to the $500,000 liquidated damages. The trial court granted ConocoPhillips’ 
motion for summary judgment.26  
Olmos appealed, arguing that fact issues precluded summary judgment on 
their invocation of the force majeure clause and regarding whether the 
liquidated damages provision was an unenforceable penalty.27  
Olmos first argued that the downturn in oil prices was a covered force 
majeure event because the catch-all provision covered “any other cause not 
enumerated herein but which is beyond the reasonable control of the Party 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Id. at *13. 
 23. TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 
Dist.] 2018) rev. denied, 2019 Tex. LEXIS 834 (Tex. Aug. 30, 2019). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 180. 
 27. Id. 
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whose performance is affected.”28 The court stated that, because the 
provision did not explicitly enumerate a drop in oil prices as a covered 
occurrence, the real issue is whether the catch-all provision includes events 
that are foreseeable.29 The court held that a market downturn is a foreseeable 
event and is therefore not a covered force majeure occurrence.30 
The court also used the canon of construction, ejusdem generis, to come 
to this conclusion.31 This principle states that “the latter must be limited to 
things like the former.”32 The court found that the former in this case, “fire, 
flood, storm, act of God, governmental authority, labor disputes, [and] war,” 
were not like the latter, a sudden drop in oil prices.33 The former constituted 
natural or man-made disasters which are foreseeable but happen so rarely 
that planning for them and allocating risks based on them is not practical.34 
The latter, on the other hand, occur fairly frequently and can be insured 
against through means other than a force majeure provision.35  
Olmos next claimed that the trial court erred in awarding ConocoPhillips 
the $500,000 liquidated damages because such damages constituted an 
unenforceable penalty.36 However, the court in Phillips v. Phillips found that 
these contractual damages provisions are enforceable if it is impossible or 
very difficult to estimate the amount of damages and the amount of damages 
is reasonable under the circumstances.37 Olmos asserted that the second 
element was not satisfied because the amount of damages provided for at the 
time of the agreement was not necessarily reflective of the estimated amount 
of damages at the time of the breach.38 The court, finding this was not the 
test, stated that the test looks to whether the provision is a reasonable estimate 
of the damages at the time of the agreement, not at the time of the breach.39 
The court found that the damages provided for at the time the parties entered 
into the agreement were reasonable under the circumstances.40 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. 181-182 (citing Valero Transmission Co. v. Mitchell Energy Co., 743 S.W.2d 658, 
660 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1987)). 
 29. Id. at 182 (referencing Valero Transmission Co., 743 S.W. 2d 658). 
 30. Id. at 183. 
 31. Id. at 185. 
 32. Id. (citing, e.g., Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 504 (Tex. 2015). 
 33. Id. at 186. 
 34. Id. at 184. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 187. 
 37. .Id. (citing Phillips v. Phillips, 820 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tex. 1991). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 188. 
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Therefore, the court denied both of Olmos’ arguments and affirmed the 
ruling of the trial court. Olmos has petitioned the Texas Supreme Court to 
review the court of appeals decision.41 
C. Executive Duties 
1. Texas Outfitters Limited, LLC v. Nicholson, 572 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. 
2019). 
In 2002, Texas Outfitters Limited, LLC (“Texas Outfitters”) offered to 
buy the 1,082-acre Derby Ranch (the “Ranch”) surface estate.42 The Carters 
owned 50% of the mineral interest and the Hindeses owned the other 50%.43 
In 2002, Texas Outfitters purchased from Dora Jo Carter the Carters’ surface 
estate, the executive rights to the Carters 50% mineral interest, and a 4.16% 
royalty interest.44 Texas Outfitters was later approached with two lease offers 
which were rejected in order to protect Texas Outfitters’ hunting business. 
The first offer was made in March 2010 and was for a 22% royalty and a 
$450 per acre bonus.45 The second offer was made in June 2010 and was for 
a 25% royalty and a $1,750 per acre bonus.46 The Hindeses received the 
second offer to lease their 50% mineral interest which they accepted.47 The 
Carters, wanting Texas Outfitters to lease their mineral interest, eventually 
sued Texas Outfitters after a year of negotiating a settlement of this issue. 
The Carters claimed that Texas Outfitters failure to lease was a breach of its 
duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing.48 Texas Outfitters continued to 
receive offers to lease the Carters’ mineral interest but opted to sell the 
surface and executive rights to a third party.49  
The trial court found in favor of the Carters and awarded them 
$867,654.32 in damages.50 The court of appeals affirmed, and the supreme 
court granted Texas Outfitters’ petition to hear their appeal.51 
The supreme court, noted said that determining whether an executive 
breached its duty to a non-executive turned on “whether the executive 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. at 185. 
 42. Texas Outfitters Ltd. v. Nicholson, 572 S.W.3d 647, 649 (Tex. 2019). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 649-50. 
 47. Id. at 649. 
 48. Id. at 649-50. 
 49. Id. at 650 
 50. Id. at 650-51. 
 51. Id. at 651-52. 
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engaged in acts of self-dealing that unfairly diminished the value of the non-
executive interest.”52 The court relied on the following principal findings 
from the trial court in coming to their conclusion:  
[B]y refusing the El Paso lease, Texas Outfitters “chose to 
gamble” with both its own mineral interest and the Carters' much 
larger interest knowing that the Carters did not want to take that 
gamble; Texas Outfitters refused the El Paso lease knowing the 
Hindeses had already leased their 50% interest to El Paso, thereby 
diminishing the potential pool of lessees; and refusing the lease 
allowed Texas Outfitters to retain unfettered use of the surface to 
operate its planned hunting operations and to sell the ranch at a 
profit free of any encumbrances.53 
The court, recognizing the difficulty in determining whether an executive has 
breached its duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing, affirmed the lower 
courts’ rulings finding that there was legally sufficient evidence to support 
the claim that Texas Outfitters had breached their duty to the Carters.54 The 
court focused on the evidence presented that showed it was common for other 
owners in the area who ran commercial hunting operations to lease the 
minerals to operators who accommodated the surface use.55 The court 
concluded that this evidence sufficiently supported the trial court’s 
conclusion that Texas Outfitters’ self-dealing unfairly diminished the value 
of the Carters’ non-executive interest.56 
D. Post Production Costs 
1. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. LP v. Texas Crude Energy, LLC, 573 
S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2019), reh'g denied by 2019 Tex. LEXIS 549 (Tex. 
May 31, 2019). 
In 2005 Texas Crude Energy, LLC (“Texas Crude”) and Burlington 
Resources Oil & Gas L.P. (“Burlington”) entered into a Prospect 
Development Agreement (“PDA”) and Joint Operating Agreement (“JOA”) 
for oil and gas leases in Live Oak, Karnes and Bee Counties.57 Under these 
agreements, Burlington, the operator, would receive an 87.5% working 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id. at 649 (quoting KCM Fin., LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 74 (Tex. 2015). 
 53. Id. at 654. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 656. 
 56. Id. at 657-58. 
 57. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. v. Texas Crude Energy, LLC, 573 S.W.3d 198, 201 
(Tex. 2019), reh’g denied, 2019 Tex. LEXIS 549 (Tex. May 31, 2019). 
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interest in the leases and Texas Crude would receive a 12.5% working 
interest.58 In addition, Texas Crude would receive an overriding royalty 
interest of 0% to 6.25% on leases taken within the Area of Mutual Interest 
(“AMI”).59  
The assignments of the overriding royalties contained granting and 
valuation clauses which contained similar language.60 The Granting Clause 
provided: 
[Assignor] does hereby ASSIGN, TRANSFER AND CONVEY 
unto [Assignee], its successors and assigns, those certain 
overriding royalty interests, as set out below, in the quantity 
described below in all oil, gas, condensate, drip gasoline and other 
hydrocarbons that may be produced and saved from those lands 
covered by those certain oil, gas and mineral leases described in 
Exhibit “A” attached hereto and made a part hereof for all 
purposes, and pursuant to the terms and conditions of the said oil, 
gas and mineral leases. Said overriding royalty interests shall be 
delivered to ASSIGNEE into the pipelines, tanks or other 
receptacles with which the wells may be connected, free and clear 
of all development, operating, production and other 
costs. However, ASSIGNEE shall in every case bear and pay all 
windfall profits, production and severance taxes assessed against 
such overriding royalty interest.61 
The Valuation Clause provided that the assignment “shall be subject to the 
following terms and conditions”: 
The overriding royalty interest share of production shall be 
delivered to ASSIGNEE or to its credit into the pipeline, tank or 
other receptacle to which any well or wells on such lands may be 
connected, free and clear of all royalties and all other burdens and 
all costs and expenses except the taxes thereon or attributable 
thereto, or ASSIGNOR, at ASSIGNEE's election, shall pay to 
ASSIGNEE, for ASSIGNEE's overriding royalty oil, gas or other 
minerals, the applicable percentage of the value of the oil, gas or 
other minerals, as applicable, produced and saved under the 
leases. “Value”, as used in this Assignment, shall refer to (i) in the 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (emphasis original). 
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event of an arm's length sale on the leases, the amount realized 
from such sale of such production and any products thereof, (ii) in 
the event of an arm's length sale off of the leases, the amount 
realized for the sale of such production and any products thereof, 
and (iii) in all other cases, the market value at the wells.62 
Texas Crude accepted royalty payments for nine years which reflected the 
deduction of post-production costs. The two parties began to have 
disagreements and Texas Crude eventually sued Burlington claiming that the 
Valuation Clause entitled them to royalties free of post-production costs. 
Burlington countered, arguing that the Granting Clause, Valuation Clause, 
PDA, and JOA, when read together, permitted them to deduct Texas Crude’s 
share of post-production costs.63  
The trial court, finding that Texas Crude was entitled to its royalty free of 
post-production costs, granted its motion for partial summary judgment. The 
trial court, however, authorized an interlocutory appeal which the court of 
appeals accepted. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment 
and Burlington appealed to the supreme court.64 
The supreme court stated that the dispositive issue in the case is whether 
the parties agreed to an “at the well” valuation entitling Burlington the right 
to deduct post-production costs from the royalty it paid to Texas Crude.65 In 
order to make this determination the court reviewed the Granting Clause, 
Valuation Clause, and JOA.66 The court first looked to the Granting and 
Valuation Clauses.67 On the one hand, the clauses contained “into the 
pipeline” language which would suggest an “at the well” valuation entitling 
Burlington to deduct post-production costs from its royalty payments.68 On 
the other hand, the Valuation Clause contained “amount realized” language 
which suggests that post-productions costs should not have been deducted.69 
Burlington then pulled language from the JOA to support its interpretation.70 
Burlington cited the following provision claiming it was consistent with their 
interpretation of an “at the wellhead” pricing point: 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. (emphasis original) 
 63. Id. at 202. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 203. 
 66. Id. at 204. 
 67. Id. at 204-05. 
 68. Id. at 206. 
 69. Id. at 207. 
 70. Id. at 208. 
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Each party shall have the right but not the obligation to take in 
kind or separately dispose of its proportionate share of the oil and 
gas produced from the Contract Area .... In the event any party 
shall fail to make the arrangements necessary to take in kind or 
separately dispose of its proportionate share of the oil and/or gas 
produced from the Contract Area, Operator shall have the right, 
subject to the revocation at will by the party owning it, but not the 
obligation, to purchase such oil and/or gas or sell it to others at 
any time and from time to time, and shall account to such party 
for the actual net proceeds received for such production if sold to 
a non-affiliated third party in an arm's length transaction, or the 
current market price if purchased by Operator or an affiliate of 
Operator.71 
The court found this persuasive as it had interpreted similar “net proceeds” 
language to authorize deduction of post-production costs before.72 The 
supreme court reversed the court of appeals stating that, in the context of all 
the agreements between the two, the “amount realized” language was in 
reference to the wellhead or nearby giving Burlington the right to deduct 
post-production costs from Texas Crude’s royalty payments.73  
E. Offset Requirements and Compensatory Damages 
1. Bell v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., No. 04-18-00129-CV, 2019 WL 
1139584 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 13, 2019) pet. for rev. filed 
(Jun. 27, 2019). 
This case came to the court of appeals by way of a permissive accelerated 
appeal.74 At the trial court level, the trial court found for Bell who sought 
Compensatory Royalties for the horizontal wells drilled on adjacent lease 
tracts, with at least portions of the wellbore within 330 feet of Bell’s lease.75 
The court agreed to hear two questions surrounding the Bell and Ward 
leases.76 The issues presented to the court involve lease interpretation of the 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. (emphasis original). 
 72. Id. at 209 (citing Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co., 939 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. 1996)). 
 73. Id. at 212. 
 74. Bell v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., No. 04-18-2019-CV, 2019 WL 1139584, *1 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio Mar. 13, 2019). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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similar, yet different, Bell and Ward leases.77 Both leases include language 
that reads: 
ROYALTY – OIL GROSS PROCEEDS DEFINITION. “Gross 
Proceeds” as used herein shall mean the total proceeds received 
by Lessee for any sale of Oil or condensate; .... 
ROYALTY – GAS GROSS PROCEEDS DEFINITION. “Gross 
Proceeds” as used herein shall mean the total proceeds received 
by Lessee for any sale of such Gas; .... 
HORIZONTAL OR VERTICAL WELLS. A “Horizontal Well” 
shall mean a well where it is necessary to cut a window for the 
purpose of drilling horizontally a distance of over thirty (30) feet 
from the vertical well bore and for which the TRC or the 
appropriate state agency requires directional or inclination 
surveys to be filed and a “Vertical Well” shall mean a well having 
a vertical drain hole which shall not be deviated from the vertical 
except randomly to straighten a hole which has become crooked 
in the normal course of Drilling, or to sidetrack a portion of a hole 
because of mechanical difficulty in Drilling.78 
The following language is only contained within the Bell lease: 
18. OFFSET REQUIREMENT AND COMPENSATORY 
ROYALTY. In the event a well (“Adjacent Well”) producing Oil 
or Gas in Paying Quantities is drilled and completed after the date 
of this Lease on land under which Lessor does not own the 
quantity of minerals or royalty as under the lands covered by this 
Lease, and such Adjacent Well is draining the Leased Premises or 
is deemed draining if the Adjacent Well is located within three 
hundred thirty (330) feet of the Leased Premises, or, when Lessee 
has an economic interest in said Adjacent Well and said Adjacent 
Well is located within four hundred sixty seven (467) feet of the 
Leased Premises (in the case of a Vertical Well, distance will be 
measured from the surface location or bottom hole location of the 
Adjacent Well, whichever is closer; in the case of a Horizontal 
Well distance will be measured from the surface location or the 
subsurface path of a horizontal drainbore, from its point of entry 
into the productive horizon to its terminus, whichever is closer), 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
292 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
 
 
then Lessee agrees to drill such offset wells which is [sic] 
reasonably designed to protect the Leased Premises from 
drainage, or at the option of Lessee, shall pay to Lessor the 
Compensatory Royalties set forth below, or execute and deliver to 
Lessor a release in recordable form releasing acreage in an amount 
equivalent to the number of acres required or permitted by the 
Texas Railroad Commission to drill an offset well to the formation 
of such Adjacent Well. Lessee shall have ninety (90) days from 
the date of first production of such Adjacent Well within which to 
Commence Actual Drilling Operations of an offset well or release 
offsetting acreage, and thereafter, Lessee's sole obligation shall be 
to pay Compensatory Royalties as set forth herein....79 
Finally, the following language is only found in the Ward lease: 
17. DUTY TO EXPLORE DEVELOP AND PROTECT. Lessee 
also hereby expressly covenants and agrees to diligently and fully 
explore, develop, and protect the Leased Premises as a reasonably 
prudent operator. 
18. OFFSET REQUIREMENT AND COMPENSATORY 
ROYALTY. In the event a well (“Adjacent Well”) producing Oil 
or Gas in Paying Quantities is drilled and completed after the date 
of this Lease on land under which Lessor does not own the 
quantity of minerals or royalty as under the lands covered by this 
Lease, and such Adjacent Well is draining the Leased Premises or 
is deemed draining if the Adjacent Well is located within the 
spacing distance as set in the current field rules as promulgated by 
the Railroad Commission of Texas but must do so if the adjacent 
well is within four hundred sixty-seven (467) feet of the Leased 
Premises, distance will be measured from the surface location or 
bottom hole location of the Adjacent Well, whichever is closer; in 
the case of a Horizontal Well distance will be measured from the 
surface location or the subsurface path of a horizontal drainbore, 
from its point of entry into the productive horizon to its terminus, 
whichever is closer), then Lessee shall within one hundred eighty 
(180) days after commencement of production from such 
Adjacent Well, Commence the Actual Drilling Operations for the 
Drilling of an offset well on the Leased Premises and diligently 
pursue such Operations to the horizon in which such Adjacent 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. 
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Well is producing, or at the option of Lessee, shall pay to Lessor 
the Compensatory Royalties set forth below, or execute and 
deliver to Lessor a release in recordable form surrendering 
acreage in an amount equivalent to the Well Tract of the Adjacent 
Well....80 
The first question presented to the court, which is the crux of Bell’s appeal, 
is whether “the formula for calculating the Compensatory Royalty based on 
take points of the Adjacent Well within the triggering distance(s)” is 
contained in the unambiguous provisions of the Leases.81 The second 
question presented, which is the focus of Chesapeake’s cross-appeal, is 
whether “the reasonably prudent operator standard appl[ies]… to the lessee’s 
offset obligations” under the unambiguous terms of the leases.82  
The court determined that both questions depended on the construction of 
Paragraph 18 of the leases.83 In examining Paragraph 18 of each lease, the 
court found that Chesapeake had three available courses of action once an 
adjacent well began producing: “(1) drill an offset well; (2) release sufficient 
acreage; or (3) pay the Compensatory Royalty.”84  
With these three options in mind, the court turned to question number two 
(noting that Chesapeake’s liability claim logically precedes Bell’s 
compensation claim).85 Chesapeake claimed that this standard was expressly 
included in the lease and provided numerous cases for support. The court 
found that Chesapeake’s supporting cases claiming that this standard was 
expressly included in the lease were inapplicable and noted that nothing in 
Paragraph 18 of either lease that would suggest Chesapeake was to be held 
to the standard of a reasonably prudent operator standard, denied 
Chesapeake’s claim and turned to Bell’s compensation claim.86 
The court first looked to the lease, which defined Compensatory Royalty 
as “an amount equal to the Royalty Share of Gross Proceeds of production 
from the Adjacent Well.”87 Further, Gross Proceeds was defined as “the total 
proceeds received by Lessee for any sale of [Oil or condensate/ Gas].”88 
Finding that the issue turned on what “total proceeds” meant, the court turned 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. at *2 
 81. Id. at *1. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at *4. 
 84. Id. at *4-5. 
 85. Id. at *5-6. 
 86. Id. *6-12. 
 87. Id. at *12. 
 88. Id. 
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to the lease language to determine if total proceeds meant “production from 
the entirety of a horizontal well, any part of which falls within the Trigger 
Distances, or production attributable only to those perforations (take points) 
that are within those Trigger Distances.”89 The court started with the 
definition of Compensatory Royalty, particularly the words “Adjacent 
Well.”90 The court found that the parties expressly stated how to determine 
if a horizontal well was within the Trigger Distances set out in the lease (“in 
the case of a Horizontal Well distance will be measured from the surface 
location or the subsurface path of a horizontal drainbore, from its point of 
entry into the productive horizon to its terminus, whichever is closer.”).91 
Finding significance in this, the court concluded that Chesapeake’s 
Paragraph 18 obligations were triggered if the surface location of the 
horizontal well is within the Trigger Distances regardless of where the well 
went from there.92 Chesapeake argued that the nature of horizontal wells and 
case law supported their argument that Compensatory Royalties should be 
measured based on the take points. However, the court found that a plain 
reading of the lease did not support this.93 The court noted that the cases were, 
again, distinguishable and if Chesapeake wanted the Compensatory 
Royalties to be calculated based on the take points, they should have said so 
in the lease.94 Therefore, the court found that the Compensatory Royalties 
due to Bell were to be calculated based on the entirety of the horizontal well 
which surface location was within the Trigger Distances specified in the 
lease.95 
F. Continuous Development Provisions 
1. Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Energen Res. Corp., 563 S.W.3d 449 
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2018) pet. for rev. filed (Mar. 13, 2019). 
Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. (“Endeavor”) was the successor in 
interest to a lease originally entered into between John Thomas Quinn 
(“Quinn”), lessor, and OGX Resources, LLC, lessee.96 The lease had a three-
year primary term and a continuous development provision, which is the 
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source of the conflict in this case.97 The provision read, in relevant part, as 
follows: “Lessee shall have the right to accumulate unused days in any 150-
day term during the continuous development program in order to extend the 
next allowed 150-day term between the completion of one well and the 
drilling of a subsequent well.”98 Endeavor, which did not begin drilling until 
145 days after the primary term had expired, drilled 12 wells over the next 
five years.99 After the twelfth well was completed, Endeavor did not begin 
drilling the thirteenth within the next 300 days.100 On the 311th day after the 
completion of the twelfth well, Quinn signed a new lease with Energen which 
quickly filed an action against Endeavor claiming that the continuous 
development provision in Endeavor’s lease had lapsed.101 Endeavor claimed 
that they had accumulated 227 additional days under the provision because 
they had the right to accumulate, for use on subsequent wells, the number of 
days that it drilled sooner than 150 days for each of the first twelve wells.102 
Energen, however, claimed that the accumulated days could only be used to 
extend that deadline for the next well drilled.103 The trial court, agreeing with 
Energen’s interpretation of the provision, granted Energen’s motion for 
summary judgment and denied Endeavor’s.104 Endeavor appealed, claiming 
that the plain language of the provision allowed them flexibility in 
accumulating unused days.105  
The court of appeals disagreed with Endeavor’s interpretation and 
affirmed the trial court’s decision.106 The court’s analysis focused on a couple 
points. First, they pointed out that the provision stated that the accumulated 
days could be used on the next allowed 150-day term.107 The court, looking 
to the dictionary for support, found this to mean that the accumulation of days 
from the early drilling on one well could only be used to extend the drilling 
of the next, or immediately following, well, not other wells drilled in the 
future.108 Second, Endeavor claimed that terminating the portions of the lease 
not yet developed would be contrary to the point of oil and gas leases, which 
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is the development of minerals.109 They claimed that the inclusion of the 
continuous development provision was so that the entire leasehold estate 
would be developed.110 The court agreed with Endeavor that this was the 
purpose of an oil and gas lease.111 However, this was one of the very reasons 
they agreed with Energen’s interpretation. The court, pointing out that 
Endeavor’s interpretation allowed Endeavor to cease development 
operations for over a year, found that Endeavor’s interpretation conflicted 
with the very purpose of the continuous development provision.112 For these 
reasons, the court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. Endeavor 
has since petitioned the supreme court for appeal.113 
G. Correction Instruments 
1. Yates Energy Corp. v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, No. 04-17-00310-CV, 
2018 WL 6626605 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 19, 2018) pet. for rev. 
filed (Jun. 27, 2019) (memo op.) 
Mary Frances Evers (“Mary”) created an intervivos trust, containing 
mineral interests, which was amended several times throughout her life.114 
The most recent amendment was executed in February 2003 and provided 
that Broadway Bank, the trustee, was to allocate the property upon her death 
to her descendants, per stirpes.115 After Mary’s death, Broadway Bank 
distributed 25% shares to each of four living descendants in fee simple via a 
2005 Mineral Deed, including John Evers.116 According to the 2003 Trust 
Amendment, John Evers was only to receive a life estate in the minerals and 
therefore Broadway Bank executed a 2006 Correction Mineral Deed to John 
for a life estate in the minerals.117 John did not sign the correction deed. In 
2012, John conveyed his interest in the minerals via a Royalty Deed to Yates 
Energy Corporation.118 Yates Energy Corporation, in compliance with a 
farmout agreement with EOG Resources, conveyed 70% of its rights in the 
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minerals to EOG Resources.119 Yates ultimately assigned the rest of their 
interest to numerous parties.120  
In 2013, a title examiner informed EOG Resources that there may be some 
issue with the 2006 Correction Mineral Deed, namely the fact that John’s 
signature was missing from the document.121Further, the 2003 Trust 
Amendment could be read as giving Broadway Bank the right to convey only 
a life estate in the subject land and therefore the 2005 Mineral Deed could 
have only conveyed to John a life estate in the minerals.122 Attempting to cure 
these errors, Broadway Bank executed an Amended Correction Deed in 2013 
including John and all the original grantees.123 However, it did not include 
Yates Energy Corporation or any of the assignees of Yates’ interest.124 After 
John died in 2014, the parties disputed whether John had conveyed his 
interest to the remaindermen of his life estate or if he had conveyed the 
interests to Yates Energy Corporation and their assignees.125 The probate 
court concluded that the 2013 Amended Correction Deed, which granted 
John Evers a life estate, was valid.126 It also concluded that Yates Energy 
Corporation had a life estate in the minerals and because John had died the 
interests were now owned by John’s remaindermen.127 
The crux of the appeal dealt with the argument that the 2013 Amended 
Correction Deed was invalid because of the material corrections statute.128 It 
is undisputed that a material correction was made under the statute, but the 
issue was whether the right people executed the corrective instrument. The 
statute first identifies who may execute a correction: 
In addition to nonmaterial corrections, including the corrections 
described by Section 5.028, the parties to the original transaction 
or the parties' heirs, successors, or assigns, as applicable may 
execute a correction instrument to make a material correction to 
the recorded original instrument of conveyance. . . .129 
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It then identifies who must execute a correction: 
A correction instrument under this section must be: 
(1) executed by each party to the recorded original instrument of 
conveyance the correction instrument is executed to correct or, if 
applicable, a party's heirs, successors, or assigns. . . . 130 
The court focused on the words “or, if applicable” in coming to its 
conclusion.131 Siding with Yates Energy Corporation, the court of appeals 
held that: 
a correction instrument making a material change must be 
executed by a party’s heirs, successors, or assigns, as opposed to 
the original parties of the recorded instrument, if the property 
interest conveyed in the original instrument has been assigned or 
conveyed by an original party to that party’s heirs, successors, or 
assigns.132 
In other words, John Evers received a full fee simple interest in the 2005 
Mineral Deed and subsequently conveyed that interest to Yates Energy 
Corporation in the 2012 Royalty Deed.133 By not including all the required 
signatures on the corrective instruments of the 2005 Mineral Deed, the 
corrective instruments were found to be ineffective.134  
H. Estoppel by Deed 
1. Trial v. Dragon, No. 18-0203, 2019 WL 2554130 (Tex. June 21, 
2019). 
Leo Trial and his six siblings each owned a 1/7 interest in a tract of land.135 
In 1983, Leo gifted half of his interest to his wife, Ruth, leaving himself with 
a 1/14 interest and his wife with a 1/14 interest.136 In 1992, Leo and his 
siblings conveyed their interest to the Dragons reserving a fifteen-year 
mineral interest.137 The Trials also generally warranted the conveyance. Ruth, 
however was not a party to the Dragon conveyance and her interest was not 
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mentioned in the conveyance.138 In 2010, Ruth died intestate, leaving each of 
her two sons, Joseph and Michael, a 1/28 interest in the subject land.139 After 
the fifteen-year mineral reservation expired, the Dragons became aware of 
the 1/14 interest that Ruth and Leo’s two sons owned and filed suit for breach 
of warranty and estoppel by deed.140 The trial court granted the Trials’ motion 
for summary judgment, which the Dragons appealed.141 The court of appeals 
reversed finding that because Leo breached the general warranty at the time 
of conveyance to the Dragon’s, estoppel by deed forbids Leo, as well as his 
“grantors, grantees, privies in blood, privies in estate, and privies in law” (his 
sons) from claiming an interest in contradiction of the general warranty.142 
The supreme court accepted the Trials’ petition for review.143  
The supreme court first addressed the applicability of the Duhig rule and 
estoppel by deed.144 The court, looking to the ruling in Duhig, concluded that 
it only applied when the grantor (Leo) “owns the exact interest to remedy the 
breach at the time of execution and equity otherwise demands it.”145 At the 
time of execution, Leo did not own the interest that would remedy the 
situation because he had already conveyed it to Ruth.146 Therefore, the Duhig 
rule did not apply. The court pointed out, however, that if Leo had held the 
interest in a trust for his two sons, the outcome may have been different.147 
The court also found that estoppel by deed did not apply. Estoppel by deed 
means that all parties to a deed are bound by the deed’s recitals, which 
operate as an estoppel.148 However, Joseph and Michael were not parties to 
the Dragon deed and they did not claim their interest arose through the 
Dragon deed.149 Therefore, the court found that estoppel by deed also did not 
apply based on these facts.150 The supreme court reversed the court of appeals 
decision on the application of the Duhig rule and estoppel by deed.151 It did, 
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however, find that the neither the trial court nor the court of appeals 
addressed the breach of warranty claim correctly.152 The court said that the 
real issue, that had not been answered by either of the previous courts is: 
whether the Trial sons are liable for damages when they fail to 
warrant and defend against their own adverse claim to the 
property—their claim deriving from the interest they inherited 
from Ruth's separate property—and if so, what the amount of 
those damages would be.153 
Because both courts failed to address this question, the supreme court 
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.154  
I. Refusal of Consent to Assignment 
1. Barrow-Shaver Res. Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., No. 17-0332, 
2019 WL 2668317 (Tex. June 28, 2019). 
Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc. (“Carrizo”) held a lease on 22,000 acres, which 
was set to expire in April 2011. In order to maintain the lease, it entered into 
a farmout agreement with Barrow-Shaver Resources Company (“Barrow-
Shaver”) in March 2011.155 The agreement provided that if Barrow-Shaver 
drilled a producing well, Carrizo would assign its interest in the 22,000-acre 
lease to Barrow-Shaver.156 The consent to assign provision in the agreement 
read: “[t]he rights provided to [Barrow-Shaver] under this Letter Agreement 
may not be assigned, subleased or otherwise transferred in whole or in part, 
without the express written consent of Carrizo.”157 Evidence demonstrated 
that Barrow-Shaver wanted language in the provision that stated consent 
would not be unreasonably withheld.158 However, after repeated oral 
assurances from Carrizo that consent would not be unreasonably withheld, 
Barrow-Shaver signed the agreement without this language included.159 
Barrow-Shaver was ultimately unsuccessful in drilling the well, but was 
approached by Raptor Petroleum II, LLC (“Raptor”) about assigning 
Barrow-Shaver’s interest in the farmout agreement.160 Carrizo would not 
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 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at *2. 
 158. Id. at *1. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at *2. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss2/23
2019] Texas 301 
 
 
consent and the deal with Raptor fell through. Barrow-Shaver sued Carrizo 
claiming breach of contract, fraud, and tortious interference.161  
The trial court found that, although the agreement was unambiguous, the 
consent to assignment provision was silent as to the reasons for which 
Carrizo could withhold its consent.162 Therefore, the court submitted the 
issues to the jury which unanimously found in favor of Barrow-Shaver for 
approximately $27 million. On appeal, the court reversed this decision 
finding that, because the consent to assign provision was silent as to when 
consent could be withheld, Carrizo could withhold consent for any reason.  
The first issue addressed by the supreme court was whether Carrizo had 
an unqualified right to withhold consent. Barrow-Shaver claimed that, 
according to industry custom, consent could not be unreasonable or 
arbitrarily withheld.163 The court first stated that the consent to assign 
provision was unambiguous.164 However, the agreement was silent as to 
when consent could be withheld.165 In cases such as this, the court can only 
supplement or give further definition to silence as it relates to a material term 
of the contract.166 The court here, noting that the purpose of a farmout 
agreement is the farmee’s obligation to drill, found that a consent to assign 
provision is not material to the farmout and therefore cannot be supplemented 
or given further definition.167 The court also found that when an agreement 
is sufficiently definite to understand each parties’ rights obligations, as they 
are here, additional terms are not material.168  
Barrow-Shaver next argued that the court should impose an implied duty 
of good faith and fair dealing on Carrizo.169 The court, however, found that, 
absent a special relationship, parties to an agreement have no duty to act in 
good faith.170 Here, the court found that because both parties are sophisticated 
in oil and gas matters, farmouts do not inherently create unequal bargaining 
power for one side, and the two parties specifically negotiated this provision, 
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 170. Id. at *13. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
302 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
 
 
that there was no special relationship between the two and therefore no 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.171  
Finding that the terms of the farmout agreement were unambiguous and 
that there was no duty of good faith and fair dealing, the court turned to the 
meaning of the consent to assign provision.172 Agreeing with the court of 
appeals, the supreme court found that Carrizo’s ability to withhold consent 
was unqualified could therefore withhold “consent for any reason, expressed 
or not, reasonable or not, legitimate or not, or no reason at all.”173 Therefore, 
because the provision allowed Carrizo to withhold its consent for any reason, 
it could not have breached the agreement and there could not have been 
tortious interference as a matter of law and therefore these claims should not 
have been submitted to the jury.174 
Justice Guzman, disagreeing with the majority, noted that precedent 
throughout the years supports the conclusion that even though the terms of 
the consent to assign provision were unambiguous, the court should have 
allowed in trade custom and usage to inform the contract which would have 
resulted in the application of a reasonableness standard to the provision. By 
not doing so, the court erred in concluding that the consent to assign 
provision was silent as to when consent could be withheld, which would have 
been answered using trade custom and usage evidence. Further, because trade 
custom and usage in a specific scenario is a question of fact, the trial court 
properly submitted the issue to the jury. Another point to the trade custom 
and usage issue was that Carrizo could have just contracted around it and that 
by not doing so, and assuring Barrow-Shaver it would give consent, 
established that Carrizo intended to abide by trade custom and usage.175  
The court, addressing the second issue, turned to Barrow-Shaver’s fraud 
claim.176 The crux of the court’s holding on this matter deals with one 
essential element of a fraud claim: whether the claimant justifiably relied on 
the representation.177 The court here found that Barrow-Shaver did not 
justifiably rely on Carrizo’s landman’s claim that consent would not be 
unreasonably withheld.178 First, this oral promise was in direct contradiction 
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to the written contract.179 Second, Barrow-Shaver is a sophisticated party 
with full understanding of the implications of the consent to assign provision 
that they agreed to.180 Third, Carrizo’s oral representations were vague and 
unverifiable which should have alerted Barrow-Shaver that they could not be 
relied upon.181 Finally, Barrow-Shaver should have known that the landman 
acting on behalf of Carrizo had no authority to assure Barrow-Shaver that 
consent would not be unreasonably withheld.182 
Justice Guzman also disagreed with the majority’s conclusion as to the 
fraud claim. Justice Guzman stated that “a fraud claim can be based on a 
promise made with no intention of performing, irrespective of whether the 
promise is later subsumed within a contract” because “the legal duty not to 
fraudulently procure a contract is separate and independent from the duties 
established by the contract itself.”183 Further, the court has recognized that 
“[b]reach alone is no evidence that breach was intended when the contract 
was originally made,” but “breach combined with ‘slight circumstantial 
evidence’ of fraud is enough to support a verdict for fraudulent 
inducement.”184 Justice Guzman, who would have found a breach of contract 
as stated above, stated that she would have also found at least some evidence 
that Carrizo did not intend to give consent, regardless of their repeated 
representations, and therefore perpetrated a fraud upon Barrow-Shaver.185  
Therefore, because the majority found that the consent to assign provision 
was unambiguous, there was no breach of the farmout agreement.186 Also, 
because Barrow-Shaver could not have justifiably relied on Carrizo’s 
representations, there could not have been a fraud.187  
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J. Cotenancy 
1. Cimarex Energy Co. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 574 S.W.3d 73 
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2019), pet. for rev. filed (June 28, 2019). 
In late 2009, Cimarex leased an undivided 1/6 mineral interest held by the 
Estate of F. Kirk Johnson, III.188 Between 2007 and 2010, Anadarko acquired 
the other 15/16 mineral interests in the land.189 In 2011 and 2012, Anadarko 
commenced drilling operations on two wells on the land, and by December 
2012, both wells were producing in paying quantities.190 In early 2011, F. 
Kirk Johnson, IV and Marsland Johnson succeeded the interests of the Estate 
of F. Kirk Johnson, III and executed two top leases to Petro-Land Group, 
Inc., which eventually assigned the leases to Anadarko.191 Cimarex learned 
of the wells in September 2012 and subsequently wrote a letter to Anadarko 
demanding their proportionate share of royalties, an accounting of the costs 
and revenues associated with the wells, and affording them the opportunity 
to join in the operation of the wells through a joint operating agreement 
(“JOA”).192 Anadarko eventually responded recognizing Cimarex’s right to 
its proportionate share of royalties because of its status as a non-participating 
co-tenant.193 However, the payments never came and Cimarex sued. In 
addition, Cimarex filed an application to force pool an Anadarko well that 
was located one foot within Cimarex’s lease boundary.194  
The two parties reached a settlement in June 2013 which resolved the 
lawsuit and the force pooling application.195 The settlement provided that: (1) 
Anadarko would provide an accounting for Cimarex’s share of production on 
the two wells; (2) they would pay them for their proportionate share of 
production through May 2013, less Cimarex’s share of drilling, completion, 
and operating costs; and (3) going forward, Anadarko would account to 
Cimarex monthly for their share of production.196 Both parties agreed to pay 
their respective royalties to their lessors.197  
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Anadarko complied with the settlement agreement, and in December 
2014, when the primary term of Cimarex’s lease expired, Anadarko ceased 
making payments to Cimarex.198 Anadarko claimed that Cimarex’s lease had 
expired and therefore there was no longer an obligation to make the 
payments.199 Further, it claimed that because the lease had expired and 
Anadarko had paid the bonus provided for in the top lease, Anadarko had the 
only valid lease on the property.200 Cimarex sued, alleging Anadarko had 
breached their contractual obligation under the settlement agreement.201 Both 
parties moved for summary judgment.202 The trial court granted Anadarko’s 
motion for summary judgment finding that Cimarex could not rely on 
Anadarko’s production to extend the lease into the secondary term.203 
Cimarex appealed.  
Cimarex raised three arguments during its appeal as to why the lease had 
not terminated in December 2014. First, it argued that the terms of the lease 
were ambiguous, hereby raising an issue of fact which should have been 
presented to a jury.204 The court of appeals found that there was only one 
reasonable interpretation of the lease and therefore the lease was 
unambiguous.205 The court, in coming to this conclusion, focused on the 
language of the habendum clause: “as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced 
from said land or from land with which said land is pooled.”206 Cimarex 
argued that the passive nature of the provision only required production on 
the land and did not require any specific party to cause the production.207 
However, the court recognized that various Texas courts, including their 
own, had interpreted similar language to require the lessee to be the party to 
cause production.208 In other words, Cimarex needed to be the one that caused 
production from said land, not a third party such as Anadarko. The court also 
found significance in the fact that, because the lease was signed with 
Cimarex, it was the lessor’s intent that Cimarex would be the party to cause 
the production.209 
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Cimarex’s second argument was that the lease unambiguously allowed 
Cimarex to rely on Anadarko’s production to carry the lease into the 
secondary term.210 Cimarex noted that the primary term was written in the 
passive voice, did not specify who was to cause production, and allowed 
Cimarex to rely on Anadarko’s production.211 They then pointed out that the 
habendum clause was also written in the passive voice and failed to specify 
who was to cause production and therefore, it would be inconsistent to say 
that Cimarex could not also rely on Anadarko’s production during the 
secondary term.212 The court disagreed with this argument as well. The court 
found that the lessor has the right to impose different requirements on a lessee 
during the primary and secondary terms.213 The court stated:  
[T]here is nothing inherently contradictory with a lessor requiring 
a lessee to make royalty payments on a co-tenant’s production 
during the primary term of a lease—particularly where the 
primary term is paid-up—while at the same time requiring the 
lessee to cause its own production on the subject property in order 
to extend the lease into a secondary term, where there is no cash 
consideration paid.214 
Cimarex’s final argument was that the settlement agreement, in effect, 
created a JOA between the two parties.215 The court, finding none of the 
hallmarks of a JOA and finding it significant that the settlement agreement 
consistently referred to Cimarex as a “non-participating co-tenant”, denied 
this argument and again found in favor of Anadarko.216 
Rejecting all of Cimarex’s arguments that the lease did not actually 
terminate in December 2014, the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling in 
favor of Anadarko.217  
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L. Top Leases 
1. TRO-X, L.P. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 548 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. 
2018). 
In 2007, TRO-X executed oil and gas leases (“2007 Leases”) with David 
E. Cooper; Hill–Cooper, Ltd.; Richard W. Cooper; Kendall C. Hill; and 
Shirley Cooper (“the Coopers”).218 The leases contained a provision 
requiring TRO-X to drill an offset well if a well was drilled on adjacent land 
within 660 feet of the lease boundaries and producing in paying quantities.219 
If TRO-X failed to do so, then upon demand from the Coopers, TRO-X was 
required to release a specified portion of the lease.220 TRO-X later assigned 
its interest to Eagle Oil & Gas Co. (“Eagle Oil”).221 The participation 
agreement, which effectuated the assignment, contained a 5% working 
interest back-in option to TRO-X if the leases reached “project payout.”222 
The participation agreement also included an anti-wash out clause providing 
that the back in option could not be eliminated by the surrender of the leases 
by Eagle Oil or a subsequent assignee and the subsequent reacquisition of a 
lease on the same land free of the 5% working interest.223  
Eagle Oil assigned its interest in the 2007 Leases to Anadarko.224 
Anadarko eventually completed a well within 660 feet of the 2007 Leases 
boundary, and failed to complete an offset well as required.225 In May 2011, 
Richard Cooper wrote a letter to Anadarko demanding that the land specified 
in the lease be released due to Anadarko’s failure to drill the offset well.226 
Anadarko complied and then approached the Coopers about signing new 
leases on the interests covered under the 2007 Leases.227 The Coopers, 
reaching agreeable terms with Anadarko, executed new leases on their 
interest in 2011 (“2011 Leases”).228 The 2011 Leases do not mention the 
2007 Leases, nor do they contain language releasing the 2007 Leases.229 
Although the 2011 Leases did not contain language releasing the 2007 
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Leases, Anadarko did record releases (“the Releases”) of the 2007 Leases in 
June 2011 within a few days of when the 2011 Leases were recorded.230 
TRO-X approached Anadarko about its back in option and Anadarko denied 
its validity.231 TRO-X’s sued.232  
The trial court found that the 2011 Leases were top leases because the 
2007 leases remained in effect until the Releases were executed, which was 
after the execution of the 2011 Leases.233 On appeal, the court determined 
that TRO-X was tasked with proving that the Coopers did not intend for the 
2011 Leases to terminate the 2007 Leases in order to prevail.234 The court, 
after reviewing the evidence presented, determined that TRO-X failed to 
prove the Coopers intent for the 2011 Leases to be top leases and therefore 
reversed the trial court’s holding.235 
Whether or not the 2011 Leases were top leases of the 2007 Leases 
remained the main issue at the supreme court.236 Anadarko claimed that, 
because the “leases did not exist at the same time, and the 2011 Leases were 
not contingent on expiration or termination of the 2007 Leases because 
execution of the 2011 Leases terminated the 2007 Leases,” the 2011 Leases 
were not top leases.237 TRO-X countered claiming that, absent discrete 
evidence of intent to eliminate a lease(s), predecessor existing leases remain 
effective. The supreme court sided with Anadarko.238 The court stated that:  
an existing lease between the parties as to an interest terminates 
when the parties enter into a new lease covering that interest 
unless the new lease objectively demonstrates that both parties 
intended for the new lease not to terminate the prior lease between 
them.239 
Further, the court clarified that the party claiming that a new lease did not 
terminate the previous one, in this case TRO-X has the burden of proving the 
parties’ intent that the previous lease was to survive execution of the new 
lease.240 It also clarified that it is the intent of both parties that is relevant, not 
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just the lessors.241 The court found that TRO-X did fulfill this burden and 
therefore the 2011 Leases terminated the 2007 Leases, hereby affirming that 
court of appeals decision.242 
M. Upcoming Cases 
1. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Leon Oscar Ramirez, Jr., 534 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio 2017), cert. granted 2019 Tex. LEXIS 716 (Tex. 
June 28, 2019). 
Leon Oscar Ramirez, Sr. (“Leon Sr.”) was the beneficiary of a life estate 
of a 1/4 interest in a tract of land which he inherited from his mother, 
Leonor.243 Leon Sr. executed a lease with ConocoPhillips (“Conoco”) for his 
interest in the land in 1993 and 1997.244 The remaindermen of Leon Sr.’s 
interest, Leon Oscar Ramirez, Jr. (“Leon Jr.”), Minerva, and Rosalinda, were 
not signatories to these leases.245 Leon Sr. passed away in 2006, terminating 
his life estate.246 
In 2010, Leon Jr., Minerva, and Rosalinda filed suit against Conoco 
claiming that, because they were remainderman and had an interest in the 
subject land’s minerals, and they did not sign the prior leases, the leases were 
not binding on them and therefore they were entitled to a cotenancy 
accounting and payment of their proportionate share of production by 
Conoco.247 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling in favor of 
Leon Jr., Minerva, and Rosalinda finding that the leases were not binding on 
them and therefore they were cotenants entitled to their share of production 
from the leases.248  
The Texas supreme court granted review of this case in June 2019. Oral 
arguments are set for September 17, 2019.249  
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